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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
At issue on this appeal is the requirement under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
29 U.S.C. SS 1001-1461, that an employer notify 
participants of a material change in a welfare plan. Plaintiff 
Joseph Lettrich contends that he left his position as a 
pharmacist with J.C. Penney Company, Inc. in 1997 under 
the belief that he was entitled to the severance benefits 
established in 1988 by J.C. Penney for qualified employees. 
J.C. Penney denied his request for benefits on the ground 
that the company had rescinded the separation pay 
program in 1993. Lettrich sued J.C. Penney under ERISA 
claiming that the cancellation was void for lack of effective 
notice of that material change in the program. He also 
contends that he is entitled to the benefits under an 
equitable estoppel theory. The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of J.C. Penney. Lettrichfiled a 
timely appeal. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
The following facts are not in dispute. In 1988, J.C. 
Penney adopted a Separation Allowance Program (herein 
the "separation pay program" or the "program") for its 
profit-sharing employees in an effort to alleviate growing 
employee concerns over job security and the possibility of 
lost welfare benefits. These employee concerns emanated 
from the company's announced relocation of its home office 
from New York to Texas and from the vigorous acquisition 
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activity that was occurring at that time in the retail 
merchandise industry. The program addressed these 
concerns by providing a lump-sum severance payment if an 
eligible employee was terminated within two years of a 
change of control. "Change of control" was defined to 
include a merger or consolidation. The size of the severance 
payment was to be based on the employee's length of 
service. The program also provided that the medical and 
dental coverage, term life insurance, stock options and a 
relocation allowance would be extended. 
 
The program specified that it would continue for a term 
of five years, and would automatically renew for another 
five-year term unless the Board of Directors canceled the 
program sixty days before the termination date. 
 
After J.C. Penney established the separation pay 
program, the company circulated news of this program to 
eligible employees along with a descriptive brochure that 
included the following: 
 
       The Separation Allowance Program provides for both 
       separation pay and benefits if you lose your job within 
       a certain period after a change of control of the 
       Company. It is designed for your peace of mind. It 
       is a tangible form of reassurance of JCPenney's 
       commitment to you. 
 
       Take some time to understand what the program offers 
       and share it with your family. Then, file it away with 
       your other important papers. This program should 
       remove any distracting concerns you may have about 
       the future. And with this protection in place -- you can 
       move forward and continue making the most of the 
       present. 
 
App. at 30. 
 
Employees were notified that the Board of Directors could 
abolish the separation pay program in five years but that if 
no steps were taken to do so, the program would renew 
automatically for another five-year term. J.C. Penney 
requested all company managers to hold special meetings 
to communicate the new separation pay program personally 
to all eligible employees in their unit. For that purpose, the 
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company provided a video message discussing the reasons 
for the new program, copies of the descriptive brochure, a 
scripted discussion guide, and a list of potential questions 
and answers. 
 
Five years later, on November 11, 1992, the J.C. Penney 
Board of Directors terminated the separation pay program. 
The company's notification to participants of this change in 
benefits came by way of inclusion in its 1993 notice of 
shareholders meeting and proxy statement (hereafter 
"Notice of Meeting") of a section titled Separation Allowance 
Program. This notification was placed in the middle (after 
page 30) of the sixty-two page Notice of Meeting. It read as 
follows: 
 
       Separation Allowance Program. In March, 1988, the 
       Board of Directors adopted a Separation Allowance 
       Program ("Separation Program") for profit-sharing 
       management associates, including executive officers; 
       adopted a Pension Plan amendment designed to protect 
       the surplus assets in that plan for all employees ("Plan 
       Amendment"); and, in 1989, 1990, and 1991, granted 
       contingent stock options to participants in the 
       Company's Equity Plan ("Contingent Stock Options"), 
       which would become exercisable in the event of a 
       "change of control" regarding the Company and an 
       option holder's employment termination within two 
       years thereafter. These actions were taken to address 
       employee concerns regarding job and benefits security 
       in light of the Company's announced relocation of its 
       Home Office from New York to Texas, and in light of 
       the active acquisition activity which was occurring at 
       that time in the retail merchandise industry. The 
       Separation Program was effective for five years and 
       provided for automatic renewal for subsequent five- 
       year periods, unless terminated by the Board. 
 
       Due to the changed circumstances that have 
       occurred since the 1988 implementation of these three 
       programs, including the completion of the Company's 
       successful relocation, the Board determined in 
       November, 1992, that: (1) the Separation Program not 
       be renewed for an additional five-year period; (2) the 
       Plan Amendment be retained; and (3) the Company 
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       request holders of Contingent Stock Options to 
       surrender them in exchange for, on a pre-split basis, 
       one normal stock option for each ten Contingent Stock 
       Options so surrendered (See "Option/SAR Grants in 
       Last Fiscal Year" table on page 22.) 
 
       As a result of these actions by the Board of Directors, 
       the Separation Program terminated on March 14, 1993. 
       . . . 
 
App. at 77. 
 
The page facing this notification contained the 
announcement of a new 1993 Equity Plan that would 
replace the separation pay program. The Equity Plan 
required shareholder approval to become effective. Unlike 
the separation pay program which had applied to a large 
group of "profit sharing associates," store managers, 
assistant managers and certain eligible associates, the 
Equity Plan was to apply to no more than 2,000 employees. 
 
The Assistant Manager of Chemical Bank, the transfer 
agent for J.C. Penney, testified that the bank mailed a copy 
of the Notice of Meeting to each plan participant. All 
employees entitled to benefits under the separation pay 
program were shareholders. Lettrich does not contest that 
the Notice of Meeting was sent to all affected employees, 
including himself, and that it contained the information 
required by ERISA and the plan. Specifically, in the notice 
J.C. Penney stated that due to, inter alia, the completion of 
the Company's successful relocation, the Board determined 
in November 1992 not to renew the separation pay program 
and that "the Separation Program terminated on March 14, 
1993." Id. 
 
The notification included in the Notice of Meeting 
constituted the only notification to the employees/ 
participants of the termination of the separation pay 
program. Nothing on the cover of the Notice of Meeting 
called attention to the inclusion of the notification 
announcing the program's termination or to the page on 
which it was placed. J.C. Penney had previously distributed 
Benefit Information Flyers to all employees to notify them of 
changes in medical and dental benefits, but it did not use 
that procedure on this occasion. Nor did it send the 
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notification of the termination of the program to Robert 
Perrin, the Vice President of Human Resources within Thrift 
Drug, who had responsibility for promoting and 
implementing the separation pay program. It happened that 
Perrin, who maintained his own internal follow-up system, 
inquired about the status of the program. In response, J.C. 
Penney informed Perrin of the program's termination. There 
is no allegation that J.C. Penney prohibited or in any way 
discouraged Perrin from spreading word of the program's 
termination. He testified at his deposition that he did not 
do so on his own because he knew such notices require 
legal approval and he expected J.C. Penney to send out 
notice in an information flyer. When employees called 
Perrin regarding the separation pay program, he informed 
them that J.C. Penney had terminated that program. 
 
B. 
 
Lettrich was first employed by Thrift Drug as a 
pharmacist in 1975. Thrift Drug was then a division of J.C. 
Penney although it was subsequently spun-off as a 
subsidiary. In 1996, J.C. Penney acquired Eckerd Drug Co. 
and began integrating the pharmacist services offered by 
Eckerd with those already provided by J.C. Penney through 
its subsidiary, Thrift Drug. The Thrift Drug store where 
Lettrich worked was closed and reopened under the name 
Eckerd. On March 8, 1997, Lettrich was advised that he 
could retain his job as an employee of Eckerd if he 
relinquished his position as store manager and accepted a 
cut in pay. Lettrich briefly accepted this offer only to resign 
several months later. At that time, Lettrich, who regarded 
the combination with Eckerd as a change of control, 
requested the severance pay to which he believed he was 
entitled under the separation pay program. J.C. Penney 
denied his request on the ground that it had discontinued 
that program four years earlier. Lettrich contends that he 
was unaware of the termination of the program because 
J.C. Penney concealed the notification in the Notice of 
Meeting and failed to alert employees that the Notice of 
Meeting contained important information regarding welfare 
benefits. 
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Lettrich filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania against J.C. Penney on 
behalf of himself and others similarly situated pursuant to 
S 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.S 1132(a)(1)(B). He 
contends that J.C. Penney's languid attempt to notify 
participants of the termination of the separation pay 
program failed to satisfy ERISA's notice and disclosure 
requirements set forth in 29 U.S.C. S 1024(b)(1)(B) and 24 
C.F.R. 2520.104-1(b)(1). In his complaint, Lettrich claims 
that J.C. Penney actively concealed the program's 
termination from a majority of the program's participants 
by placing the notification in a shareholders' Notice of 
Meeting where few, if any, employees would notice it, failing 
to use the effective and customary internal procedure for 
notification of benefit changes, and providing actual notice 
of the program's termination to only a select group of 
officers. 
 
The case was referred to a Magistrate Judge for pretrial 
proceedings. Thereafter, J.C. Penney moved for summary 
judgment. The Magistrate Judge accepted Lettrich's 
position that he resigned from J.C. Penney believing he 
would receive severance pay under the separation pay 
program. She further stated, "[i]t is not surprising that 
[Lettrich] was not aware of the termination of the 
separation allowance program since the notice of 
termination was `buried' in the notice of the annual 
meeting." Amended Report and Recommendation, Doc. # 23 
(Nov. 24, 1998) at 10 (hereafter "Report and 
Recommendation").1 The court agreed with Lettrich that he 
did not receive the notification required by the regulation 
promulgated pursuant to ERISA. Nevertheless, relying on 
our decision in Ackerman v. Warnaco, Inc., 55 F.3d 117 (3d 
Cir. 1995), she recommended that J.C. Penney's motion for 
summary judgment be granted, stating: "defects in notice 
do not entitle an employee to receive the benefits unless the 
employee can show extraordinary circumstances such as 
bad faith by his employer or active concealment of a change 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The original Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, dated 
October 15, 1998, was amended following Lettrich's objections to 
acknowledge that he was a participant covered under the plan, not 
merely a beneficiary. 
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in the benefits plan." Id. The Magistrate Judge concluded 
that Lettrich had provided no such evidence and 
recommended granting summary judgment for the 
 
defendant. The District Court adopted the recommendation 
and granted J.C. Penney's motion for summary judgment. 
At the same time, the court denied Lettrich's motion to 
maintain the action as a class action as moot. Lettrich 
timely filed this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. We engage in plenary review of a District 
Court's grant of summary judgment and consider the facts 
in the light most favorable to Lettrich. See, e.g., Seitzinger 
v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 238 (3d Cir. 
1999). To prevail, J.C. Penney must show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that J.C. Penney 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 
247 (1986). 
 
III. 
 
ERISA recognizes two types of employee benefit plans, 
pension plans and welfare benefits plans, and has different 
requirements for each. Unlike the rules governing pension 
plans, see 29 U.S.C. SS 1051-1061, there is no automatic 
vesting requirement for welfare benefits. The parties agree 
that J.C. Penney's Separation Allowance Program was a 
welfare benefits plan. As the Supreme Court made clear, 
"ERISA does not create any substantive entitlement to 
employer-provided health benefits or any other kind of 
welfare benefits," and employers are "generally free . . . , for 
any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate 
welfare plans." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 
U.S. 73, 78 (1995). 
 
This does not mean that welfare benefits plans are not 
subject to any regulations at all. ERISA requires, inter alia, 
that any change or modification to a welfare plan must be 
in writing. See 29 U.S.C. S 1102(a)(1); Hozier v. Midwest 
Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1162-64 (3d Cir. 1990) 
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(holding that failure to follow this procedural requirement 
negates the effectiveness of the attempted modification). In 
addition, ERISA requires that plan administrators furnish 
participants with a summary of any material modifications 
written in a manner calculated to be understood by the 
average participant. See 29 U.S.C. S 1022(a). ERISA also 
requires that a welfare benefits plan must include an 
amendment procedure. See 29 U.S.C. S 1102(b)(3). In 
Curtiss Wright, the Supreme Court held that the employer 
must follow the amendment procedure set out in the plan, 
and it remanded for a determination whether there was 
compliance with that amendment procedure. 514 U.S. at 
85. 
 
In Ackerman v. Warnaco, Inc., 55 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1995), 
decided a few months after the Supreme Court's decision in 
Curtiss-Wright, this court rejected the employer's contention 
that the amendment procedures of ERISA are inapplicable 
to the complete rescission of a benefit plan. We stated that 
"the requirements of section 402(b)(3) apply to plan 
terminations as well as plan amendments," reasoning that 
"it is anomalous to suggest that ERISA offers employees 
protection from mere changes in employee benefit plans, 
but does not afford protection against wholesale elimination 
of benefits." Id. at 121; see also Deibler v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers' Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206, 210 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 
The J.C. Penney plan required a vote by its Board of 
Directors sixty days prior to March 14, 1993 for the 
termination of the welfare plan to be effective. The vote 
taken November 11, 1992 satisfied this procedural 
requirement, and Lettrich does not contend otherwise. Nor 
does he contend that the notice failed to satisfy the ERISA 
requirement that any material modification be written in a 
manner calculated to be understood by the average 
participant. See 29 U.S.C. S 1022(a). Instead, the thrust of 
Lettrich's complaint is that J.C. Penney failed to give the 
plan participants the notice that was required. 
 
Under ERISA's notice and disclosure requirements, the 
administrator of an employee benefit plan (here J.C. 
Penney) must furnish participants and beneficiaries with a 
readily understandable summary of any "material 
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modifications" in accordance with the notice and disclosure 
requirements contained in S 1024(b)(1). See 29 U.S.C. 
S 1022. The requirements set forth in S 1024(b)(1) call for "a 
summary description of such modification or change. . . 
[to] be furnished not later than 210 days after the end of 
the plan year in which the change is adopted to each 
participant, and to each beneficiary who is receiving 
benefits under the plan." 29 U.S.C. S 1024(b)(1). 
 
The notice requirements were further amplified by a 
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant 
to authority provided by the statute. That regulation 
provides that a plan administrator must notify participants 
and beneficiaries of material reductions in covered services 
or benefits by using measures reasonably calculated to 
ensure actual receipt of the material by the plan 
participants. See 29 C.F.R. 2520.104b-1(b)(1). Lettrich's 
argument thus is that the placement of the notification of 
the termination of the separation pay program in the 
annual shareholders' Notice of Meeting was not reasonably 
calculated to ensure actual receipt of the notification of 
termination. 
 
The Magistrate Judge did not disagree with Lettrich's 
complaint about the inadequacy of the notice. She 
recognized that "the notice of termination was`buried' in 
the notice of the annual meeting" and concluded that 
Lettrich "did not receive the notice required by 29 C.F.R. 
S 2520.104b-1(b)(1)." Report and Recommendation at 10. 
We agree that there is at least a factual issue concerning 
whether the notice requirement was met in this case. The 
issue of notice is not merely whether the document was 
mailed and received. We construe the regulation which 
focuses on the need to take measures reasonably calculated 
to ensure actual receipt of the material to contemplate that 
in some situations mailing may not be enough if it is not 
reasonably calculated to alert the recipients of the 
significance of the mailing. We do not decide whether that 
is the case here, but we believe a fact finder could conclude 
that a 2 or 3 paragraph notice of termination of a welfare 
benefit which, in the Magistrate Judge's words, was 
"buried" in the middle of a 61-page notice of a shareholders 
meeting with nothing in the exterior to call it to the 
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attention of the participants does not satisfy the 
requirement. 
 
The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal or 
summary judgment for J.C. Penney based on her 
interpretation of our opinion in Ackerman, and the District 
Court adopted the recommendation. The facts in Ackerman 
are somewhat comparable to those here. There, as here, the 
employer terminated a severance program. There, as here, 
the plaintiffs argued that they had not received adequate 
notice of the deletion of the termination allowance policy. 
Although notice of the termination of the program was 
included in the company's 1991 handbook, neither the 
handbook nor any other notice of the termination of the 
policy was distributed to the employees at the Altoona 
plant, nor were there any meetings held at the plant to 
advise the employees of the change. The district court in 
Ackerman, similar to the ruling of the Magistrate Judge 
here, entered summary judgment for the employer after 
emphasizing that a procedural defect in notice does not give 
rise to a substantive remedy and finding no extraordinary 
circumstances to warrant deviating from the general rule. 
On appeal, we acknowledged the validity of this general 
rule, but stated that nonetheless there are situations, 
usually presenting extraordinary circumstances, where the 
remedy of striking a plan amendment may be available. 
Ackerman, 55 F.3d at 125 n.8. The two such situations 
delineated in Ackerman were "where the employer has acted 
in bad faith, or has actively concealed a change in a benefit 
plan, and the covered employees have been substantially 
harmed by virtue of the employer's actions." Id. at 125. 
 
In reversing the grant of summary judgment in 
Ackerman, we focused on the active concealment exception. 
We noted (1) the complete failure to provide the handbook 
to the Altoona employees; (2) the failure to hold scheduled 
meetings with Altoona employees; (3) the issuance of a 
potentially misleading letter to the employees concerning 
"changes" to the severance program rather than the 
termination of the program; and (4) the hostile employment 
climate at the Altoona plant. Id. at 125. We concluded that 
a reasonable factfinder could infer that the employer 
actively concealed the change in the severance policy in 
 
                                11 
  
order to prevent employees at the Altoona plant from 
leaving, and remanded for further findings. 
 
In this case, the Magistrate Judge, construing our 
opinion in Ackerman to limit the circumstances for ordering 
rescission to employer bad faith or active concealment of 
the notice of termination, concluded that Lettrich produced 
no such evidence. The Magistrate Judge distinguished 
Ackerman on the ground that Ackerman presented 
"suspicious circumstances" which the employer tried to 
explain as bureaucratic bungling and that the employer 
admitted that not all of the employees had received notice 
of the rescission of the policy within the required 210 days 
of the end of the plan year in which the change was 
adopted. Report and Recommendation at 8. The Magistrate 
Judge concluded that the J.C. Penney situation was 
different because "Plaintiff did receive the notice although it 
was buried in the Notice of 1993 Annual Meeting of 
Stockholders and Proxy Statement." 
 
It appears that the Magistrate Judge construed the 
concept of active concealment too narrowly. J.C. Penney's 
actions here are similar to those of Warnaco, the employer 
in Ackerman. Like Warnaco, it held no meeting for the 
employees to advise them of the change in policy. Like 
Warnaco, it sent no letter (other than the Notice of Meeting) 
to each employee. Like Warnaco, J.C. Penney, at least at 
the inception, was desirous of keeping its employee staff 
intact. In Ackerman, we stated: "While we do not rule out 
the possibility that administrative error accounted for 
Warnaco's omissions, we conclude that a reasonable fact 
finder could infer from these facts and from the plaintiffs' 
evidence regarding the employment climate at the Altoona 
plant that Warnaco actively concealed the change to its 
severance policy in order to prevent employees at the 
Altoona plant from leaving." 55 F.3d at 125. 
 
Ackerman is not the only case where we raised the 
possibility of voiding a rescission of an employees' benefits 
plan for inadequate notice. In Ackerman, we noted that in 
Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d 1034, 1040 
(3d Cir. 1993), reversed on other grounds, 514 U.S. 73 
(1995) (in a portion of the opinion that had not been 
expressly reversed by the Supreme Court), we distinguished 
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between cases where the court is asked to void a plan 
amendment and cases where plaintiffs seek benefits that 
were not provided in the plan. Ackerman, 55 F.3d at 125 
n.8. We also noted in Ackerman that in our prior opinion in 
Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.3d 1155 (3d Cir. 
1990), we "implicitly recognized the possibility of striking 
down a plan amendment where there has been a reporting 
and disclosure violation concerning the amendment." Id. 
(citing Hozier, 908 F.3d at 1168-69 n.15). 
 
In other circuits as well, the courts have suggested that 
notwithstanding the general rule that plan amendments are 
valid in spite of inadequate notice, participants may recover 
the benefits under the plan before the amendment if they 
can demonstrate cognizable prejudice from the company's 
failure to fully comply with ERISA's disclosure 
requirements, see Veilleux v. Atochem North Am., Inc., 929 
F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam), make a showing of 
"bad faith, active concealment, or detrimental reliance," see 
Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 569 (7th 
Cir. 1995), or "show active concealment of the amendment 
. . . or some significant reliance upon, or possible prejudice 
flowing from the lack of notice," see Godwin v. Sun Life 
Assur. Co. of Canada, 980 F.2d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(internal quotations omitted). Although the circumstances 
in those cases did not persuade those courts to disregard 
the plan amendment, this court's holding in Ackerman 
establishes that if a plan administrator actively conceals a 
material change in welfare benefits from an employee, and 
the employee relies to his or her detriment on that omission 
by the administrator, we will invalidate the change as to 
that employee. Ackerman, 55 F.3d at 125. Our holding 
there is consistent with Congress's intent that the ERISA 
notice and disclosure provisions guarantee that"the 
individual participant knows exactly where he [or she] 
stands with respect to the plan." H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 
11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649; see 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117 
(1989). 
 
We do not suggest that the circumstances of this case 
compel a finding of active concealment sufficient to void the 
termination of the separation pay program as to Lettrich. 
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Nor do we imply that an inference of bad faith or active 
concealment may arise simply from a failure to comply with 
ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements. However, in 
light of the similarity in the circumstances here and in 
Ackerman, Lettrich's case should not have been dismissed 
on summary judgment.2 
 
We conclude that Lettrich presented sufficient evidence of 
active concealment to survive summary judgment. When 
considered in a light most favorable to Lettrich, the 
placement of the termination notice without providing any 
warning to participants that significant information 
regarding welfare benefits was enclosed deep within -- 
combined with J.C. Penney's failure to use its established 
and effective internal procedure for notifying employees of 
important changes in benefits -- could support a 
reasonable inference by a factfinder that J.C. Penney 
intended to conceal the program's termination from affected 
employees. As it is currently uncontested that Lettrich 
resigned from his position at Thrift Drug in reliance on the 
separation pay program, summary judgment for J.C. 
Penney was inappropriate. 
 
IV. 
 
We will accordingly reverse the grant of summary 
judgment for J.C. Penney and remand this case to the 
District Court for further proceedings in accord with this 
opinion. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It appears that Lettrich also contends that he is entitled to receive 
the 
separation pay benefits under the theory of equitable estoppel. See, e.g., 
International Union, United Auto., AeroSpace & Agric. Implement Workers 
of Am. v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 152 (3d Cir. 1999); Kurz v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1553-1554 (3d Cir. 1996). Given 
our disposition of this case, we need not consider that argument here. 
We do not preclude Lettrich from raising that argument on remand, at 
which point the court would need to decide whether equitable estoppel 
offers an independent basis for Lettrich's claim to benefits. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
Unlike the majority, I do not find a similarity between the 
circumstances here and those in Ackerman v. Warnaco, 
Inc., 55 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1995), sufficient to prevent the 
award of summary judgment to J.C. Penney Co. For that 
reason, I respectfully dissent. 
 
As the majority discusses, the statute, 29 U.S.C. 
S 1102(a)(1), requires that any change or modification to a 
welfare plan be in writing and that the plan administrators 
furnish participants with a summary of any material 
modifications, written in a manner calculated to be 
understood by the average participant. However, as we 
recognized in Ackerman, defects in fulfilling ERISA's 
reporting and disclosure requirements do not "under 
ordinary circumstances" give rise to a substantive remedy. 
Id. at 124. We will allow the remedy of recission of an 
amendment to a plan only under the extraordinary 
circumstances "where the employer has acted in bad faith, 
or has actively concealed a change in the benefit plan, and 
the covered employees have been substantively harmed by 
virtue of the employer's actions." Id. at 125. 
 
In Ackerman, the plaintiffs were production workers in an 
apparel factory. Unlike other plants operated by Warnaco, 
no meeting was ever held at plaintiffs' plant to inform them 
of the elimination of the termination allowance and no 
employees at their plant ever received a copy of the updated 
plan handbook. We remanded the case so that the District 
Court could determine whether under such circumstances 
Warnaco could have acted in bad faith or actively concealed 
the rescission of the allowance. 
 
In the present case, on the other hand, all participants in 
the Separation Allowance Program were profit sharing, 
management level employees and all were shareholders of 
the company. When J.C. Penney terminated the plan, 
notice of the termination was included in Notice of Meeting 
of the next shareholders meeting. Program participants, 
being shareholders, had an interest in the notice of the 
shareholders' meeting. A Notice of Meeting is a type of 
communication which will be understood by management 
level, shareholder employees. Whether the notice of 
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termination, entitled Separation Allowance Program, 
appeared on page 1 or page 30 or page 62 of the Notice of 
Meeting, it was directed at employees who were experienced 
in business affairs and interested in what would transpire 
at the shareholders meeting. 
 
I would conclude that this type of notice to this level of 
participants satisfies the statutory notice requirements. The 
majority, however, not only concludes that it does not 
satisfy the notice requirements, the majority has even 
greater problems with the notice, concluding that it could 
support a reasonable inference that J.C. Penney intended 
to conceal the program's termination from affected 
employees. If the affected employees had been production 
workers in an apparel factory, perhaps. However, they were 
not. They were management level, profit-sharing 
shareholders in the company. 
 
Moreover, the Vice President of Human Resources, who 
was responsible to promote and implement the program, 
knew of its termination. He informed any participants, who 
asked him about its status, that it had been terminated. 
 
For all the above reasons, I cannot conceive how this type 
of notice can constitute bad faith or active concealment on 
the part of J.C. Penney. In view of the circumstances of this 
case, which I do not find to be extraordinary  ones, I would 
affirm the judgment of the District Court in favor of J.C. 
Penney. 
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